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QUARTERLY

than priIncipal.A share dividend does not constitute income to the
stockholder. '-1 I Unauthorized share dividends are treated as cash dividends.-,
The court in the Folsizski2 case cites In re joy's Estate,2 ' in which

the Michigan court adopted the Massachusetts rule, holding that share
dividends arc applied to principal and are not incoine. : '' The Florida court
in I re Vail's Estate"' adopted the theory of Williams i. \Vestern Union
Telegraph Co., 2 in which Justice Cardozo stated, "A stock dividend does
not distribute property but simply dilutes the shares as they existed
before.," ' :' Florida, in adhering to this view, rendered the decision on
what would be an application of the Massachusetts rule.

The Massachusetts rule, as applied by the courts of Michigan and
Florida in the instant cases, represents the adoption of a rule of convenience
that will not impose the burden on the trustee of a complex disbursement
system of dividends received. The courts have hereby given the trustee

a plain principle to guide him.
Alan H. Dombrowskv

FEDERAL COURTS-FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS
ACT-SURVIVAL OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Performance of a contract to purchase manufactured printing presses
destined for export to Russia was refused by vendee on the ground that
an export license could not be obtained. Vendor subsequently sold the
goods to the United States at a profit, and vendec brought suit to recover

the down-payment on the contract price. On appeal from a district
court decision for defendant-vendor,' held, reversed. The plaintiff-vendee
was entitled to restitution of the down-payment beyond and above any

injury suffered by dcfcndant, whcrc an export license had been refused
by the United States, on the ground that national public policy as promulgated by Congress in the Foreign Aid Appropriations Act2 required
such a rin.
Anitorg Trading Corp. v. Miehie Printing Press 6 Mlfg. Co.,

206 U.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953).
25. Bass v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 129 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1942);
Strassburger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 124 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1941);
I teims Bakeries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 46 B.T.A. 308 (1942).
26. Hclvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943); Eisner v. Mancomber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920); Townc v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
27. Vogt Mach. Co. v. United States, 39 tlX2d 986 (Ct. CI. 1930).
28. 60 N.\V.2d 302 (Mich. 1953).
29. 247 Mich. 418, 225 N.W. 878 (1929).
30. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868).
1. 67. So.2d 665 (Fla. 1953).
32. 93 N.Y. 162 (1883).
33. Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N.Y. 162, 189 (1883).
1. 108 ". Supp. 170 (S.I). N.Y. 1952).
2. 62 Sir^Ar. 1054 (1949).

CASENO'IES
In 1937 the case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins:' purportedly ended
the concept of a "federal common law" which had developed from Swift
v.Thson. This theory was soon limited, and thereafter a body of such
law has developed as a result of federal courts deciding cases in accordance
with federal rather than state law.5 A growing series of decisions have
advanced federal common law or "policy" as controlling in situations
where state law would seem applicable under the Erie rule,6 were it not
for some connection with fields regulated by the federal government.
rfliese decisions have used as their basis the concept that where the right to
sue the United States arises under a federal statute, state law is inapplicable, 7
and its corollary that federal courts need not follow state law where federal
statutes "otherwise require or provide."8 In the realm of interstate
communications" and in relation to the National Banking system,"' the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation," and checks issued by the government subject to a national law,' 2 a federal "public policy" has been
deeed to control decisions.
It is significant to note that in cases where there have appeared
conflicts between a "national public policy" and state law, it has been
held that national policy will prevail.' 3 A notable advancement in the
development of a federal common law has been applied in the cases
where jurisdiction has been assumed by the federal court on the basis
of diversity of citizenship alone. Federal common law has been determinative of result where the court, having assumed jurisdiction on a diversity

basis rather than that of a federal question in the case, decided that the
subject matter involved was really governcd by federal policy, enunciated
in such statutes as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' - The court in the instant
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
4. 16 Pet. t (U.S. 1842).

5. Ilindcrlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 668 (1938).
6. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1937) ". . . except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress the law to be applied is the law of the state."
7. Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
8.REv. STAT. § 721 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1934).
9. O'Brien v. \\estcn Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940) (interstate
telegraph message containing libel held governed by federal law).
10. Deitrick v. Creaney, 308 U.S. 190 (1940) (in interests of uniform regulation
federal courts would determine rules implementing federal statutes),
II. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (policy to protect
FDIC expressed in the act was strong enough to require that liability on a note be
determined without concern for state law)
12. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 119 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal courts
would fashion law according to their own standards applicable to checks issued under
iederal law).

13. Mitchell v. Flintkote Co., 185 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 931 (1951)(recovery denied on contingent commission agreement to obtain

government contracts on ground that federal policy against such agreements overrides

state contract law).
14. Sola Electric Co. v.Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 1943 (1942)(Sherman
Anti'Irust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890) held to control subject matter of patent license
contract, and case was decided according to federal law); accord, Moore v. Illinois
Central R.R., 312 U.S. 360 (1941).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
case also assumed jurisdiction on the diversity basis, but proceeded to
decide the case as if the question had been a federal one from the
beginning.
The instant decision presents a set of facts which would call for
restitution of plaintiff's down-payment under both Restatement of Contracts
§ 35715 and current New York law." However, at the time the contract
was formed, New York law denied recovery to a defaulting vendee in the
absence of complete frustration of purpose. 17

rfThe

court in the instant

case, recognizing the trend in the law in favor of granting restitution
to a defaulting vendee within the proper limitations,"8 interpreted the
Foreign Aid Appropriations Act of 1949 as providing a theory of contract
law which in this type of situation entitles plaintiff to restitution. The
purpose of the applicable section of the act is to save producers or exporters
from loss where contracts were made for exporting goods, and the exports
became impossible.' 9 The particular words only relate to the Administrator's
duty to transfer the goods designed for export to a non-participating
country, which cannot under the act receive them, to a participating
country which can. The court construes this section of the act as
setting forth a manifestation of "national policy" which overrides New
York contract law, reasoning that since it would be inequitable for relief
to be extended to a producer under the act and still allow him to retain
the vendee's down-payment, the plaintiff should have restitution of his
down-payment where defendant has sold the goods to another without
loss.
It is submitted that the result achieved in the instant case is a just
and equitable one and, in theory, perhaps is supportable as an extension
of the federal common law by statutory interpretation. In view of the
language of the Foreign Aid Appropriations Act, 20 however, it seems
difficult to discern a clear-cut "national policy" reflecting a theory of
contract law. An act of judicial legislation seems manifest.
Donald 1. Norman

15. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 357 (1932) (provides for restitution in favor
of a plaintiff who is himself in default).
16. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 145-a (1952).
17. Pinman v. Kurtz, 267 App. Div. 258, 45 N.Y,S.2d 508 (3d Dep't. 1943).
18. 62 STAT. 1054 (1949).
19. Id. at 1059. "'The Administrator shall provide for the procurement of such
commodity to transfer to a participating country in accordance with the requirements
of such country, at not less than the contract price of such commodity to the producer
or exporter, as the case may be."
20. Ibid.

